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to a minimum. An interesting question is, why does one individual 
not cheat, and resort to violence sooner? This is one example of a 
strategy of restraint, where individuals do not use maximum force, 
even to achieve a valuable prize.
In the model there are two individuals contesting a reward of 
value V (so increasing the Darwinian ﬁ  tness by V of an individual 
who gains it). An individual playing the strategy Hawk will esca-
late the contest until its opponent withdraws, or it is injured and 
so must withdraw itself. An individual playing Dove will display, 
but will withdraw if the other individual escalates, thus avoiding 
injury. A Hawk versus Hawk contest will result in injury to the 
loser, which is a cost C in Darwinian ﬁ  tness. Hence there is both 
a greater potential reward, and a greater risk, associated with the 
Hawk strategy.
The game can be summarised by the following payoff matrix:
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When there are few Hawks in the population, Hawks do well 
and thus increase in number. Provided that the cost C is sufﬁ  ciently 
large, when there are many Hawks in the population, Hawks do 
badly and thus decrease in number. The population settles on a 
mixture of the two types, which can be shown to be an evolutionar-
ily stable strategy (ESS), at p = V/C, provided that V < C. If V > C, 
then Hawk is always the best strategy irrespective of the population 
mixture, and the population evolves to only contain Hawks. The 
proportion of violent contests that result in injury is simply the 
proportion of contests that involve two Hawks and is thus (V/C)2, 
and so if V is much less than C, few violent contests happen, as is 
often the case in reality.
We now proceed to consider three different natural   scenarios, 
each of which features the central question of whether to be 
aggressive or not, where the aggressive option contains both 
the prospect of greater rewards, but also a greater risk. Each of 
the three situations has its own speciﬁ  c features, and the nature 
INTRODUCTION
Violent interactions between individuals of myriad species occur 
throughout nature. The most obvious and common acts of vio-
lence occur in predation, when individuals consume those (usually) 
of another species, for example cheetahs hunting antelopes such 
as Thompson’s gazelles. Violence, or the threat of violence, also 
occurs when stronger carnivores such as lions and hyenas steal 
prey items from cheetahs. In this paper we will concentrate rather 
on intraspeciﬁ  c interactions, where the reasons for violence are 
sometimes less obvious.
The central theme of this paper is that in most (but not all, 
see e.g. Barr et al., 2008) circumstances in non-humans, resort to 
violence is logical, based upon the interests of the animals con-
cerned. We consider violent interactions in terms of the strategic 
choices of the participants using game theory, and consider some 
examples. Typically violence may occur in encounters between 
a subset of individuals in a group, and we are interested in the 
effect of the chosen behaviour on the larger group. For games a 
single measure of success, a reward, is needed and Darwinian ﬁ  t-
ness ﬁ  ts this requirement well. Animals do not behave rationally 
but if strategies are faithfully reproduced in offspring, successful 
strategies will propagate, and evolutionary stability is thus a good 
substitute for rationality. A key feature is that the ﬁ  tnesses of dif-
ferent phenotypes/strategies depend upon their frequencies so that 
an individual’s reward depends upon its opponent’s strategy as well 
as its own. Note that although a strategy is chosen by an individual 
to optimise its own performance given the behaviour of others, 
this does not usually produce optimal results for any group of 
individuals as a whole.
We outline the ideas of game theory with the classic example 
of balancing risk and reward, the Hawk–Dove game (see Maynard 
Smith, 1982). This models a pair of individuals of a single spe-
cies contesting a valuable resource, for example a territory. In real 
populations contestants often engage in ritualistic contests, which 
we shall refer to as displays, to decide the winner. Only if neither 
backs down do violent interactions occur, and thus injuries are kept 
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of the risks and rewards in each case are rather different. All have 
been modelled mathematically using game theory, and in each 
case the major (often only) strategic choice is the level of violence 
to employ.
MODELS OF KLEPTOPARASITISM
KLEPTOPARASITISM AND THE MODEL OF BROOM AND RUXTON (1998)
Kleptoparasitism is the stealing by one animal of food that has 
been caught by another. Interspeciﬁ  c  and  intraspeciﬁ  c  klep-
toparasitism are widespread among vertebrates, and commonly 
observed amongst birds, especially seabirds. Examples of intraspe-
ciﬁ  c   kleptoparasitism amongst seabirds include gulls (Steele and 
Hockey, 1995) and oystercatchers feeding on cockles (Triplet et al., 
1999), whereas skuas are common interspeciﬁ  c kleptoparasites 
(Spear et al., 1999). A good review paper is Iyengar (2008), which 
emphasises the wide range of species that employ this behaviour. 
Kleptoparasitism has been modelled using game theory in a number 
of papers, in particular a series of papers starting with Broom and 
Ruxton (1998). In this paper individuals move between searching 
for food and handling food items, and when a searching individual 
discovers one handling food, it can mount a challenge or not, which 
is the strategic element of the model. Note that the model is more 
appropriate for fast moving individuals, and the classical seabird 
interactions were the inspiration behind it.
Contests between individuals take time; if a pair ﬁ  ght this pre-
vents them from engaging in searching or handling activity for 
the duration of the contest, and contest time is one of the key 
parameters of the model. In fact contest time acts as a surrogate for 
a number of costs associated with a real contest. For example con-
tests could involve high energetic costs, and so require a  subsequent 
(possibly substantial) period of rest, and is additional time when the 
protagonists cannot be engaging in the other two main behaviours 
of searching and handling. Similarly minor injuries might require a 
recovery time before foraging can recommence (note that the risk 
of major injury, e.g. resulting from Hawk versus Hawk contests in 
the previous section, requires a different framework since the result-
ant cost cannot be adequately described by lost time). Contests 
thus have an effect on the distribution of behaviours within the 
population, so that decisions taken within a contest can affect all 
individuals, not just the two involved.
The other model parameters are listed in Table 1; values for a 
typical example are given in Holmgren (1995) (see also Luther 
and Broom, 2004). In this simple version of the model it is either 
best to challenge all the time or never. The key factor that relates 
to whether kleptoparasitism is advantageous or not is the value of 
the product νffta, with stealing optimal if and only if this value is 
less than 1, meaning that challenging should occur if and only if 
the expected contest length is sufﬁ  ciently short, the rate at which 
food can be searched for is sufﬁ  ciently low or the food density is 
sufﬁ  ciently low.
In general kleptoparasitism reduces the overall amount of food 
consumed, as time that could be spent foraging is spent ﬁ  ghting 
instead. Allowing the food density of the population to vary, there 
is a critical point where it is always best to challenge if food density 
is below a certain level, and never best above that level, and there is 
a step change in the rate of food consumption at the critical point. 
Thus at low food densities it is optimal for each individual to chal-
lenge, but all do worse as a result. In this sense the game is very 
much like the classical prisoners’ dilemma model, described by the 
payoff matrix below.
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The prisoners’ dilemma is characterized by two   strategies 
Cooperate and Defect, where the payoff for Defect against 
Cooperate (T) is the largest, decreasing through Cooperate against 
Cooperate (R), Defect against Defect (P) and Cooperate against 
Defect (S) i.e. T > R > P > S. The classic dilemma occurs because 
it is best to play Defect conditional on the opponent’s strategy 
(whichever strategy that is, since T > R and P > S), but every indi-
vidual following its own best strategy leads to the worse collective 
result of all playing Defect and receiving P, as opposed to playing 
Cooperate and receiving R.
FURTHER MODELLING DEVELOPMENTS
The work of Broom and Ruxton (1998) has been developed in a 
number of ways since. For example, when individuals are allowed 
to not resist challenges in Broom et al. (2004b), there are three 
possibilities for an ESS, Hawk (challenge and resist), Retaliator 
(do not challenge but resist) and Marauder (challenge but do not 
resist) and two ESSs can occur for the same parameter values. In 
the later paper of Broom et al. (2008) different strategies were 
allowed to have different foraging rates depending upon whether 
the individuals involved were prepared to challenge others, and 
so presumably have to look out for the possibility of making such 
a challenge (the original paper of Broom and Ruxton, 1998 did 
also consider this possibility). In this paper all three of the above 
strategies can be ESSs simultaneously, the strategy Dove (nei-
ther challenge nor resist) can be an ESS, and a number of other 
 possibilities  occur.
The Marauder strategy seems at ﬁ  rst paradoxical, since all 
individuals are prepared to challenge for food, but none are will-
ing to defend food items. Given ﬁ  ghts take no time, as food is 
immediately conceded, this means that the feeding rate in the 
population is not reduced by this behaviour. Marauder is associ-
ated with both higher feeding rates and higher ﬁ  ght times, when it 
is important not to waste time in contests, either because rewards 
without ﬁ  ghting are high as in the former case, or because the 
cost of ﬁ  ghting is high as in the latter one. There is a signiﬁ  -
cant overlap in the regions where Marauder and Retaliator are 
ESSs, so that either all challenges and nobody resists, or nobody 
challenges and all are prepared to resist, and it does not matter 
Table 1 | A summary of model parameters.
Parameter Meaning
f  The density of food available
νf  The rate at which food can be searched for
th  The handling time of a food item
ta  Twice the expected duration of a contest
νH  The rate at which handlers are found
P  The density of the foraging populationFrontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 51  |  3
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which occurs. Note that a similar scenario is observed in the 
owner intruder game of Maynard Smith and Parker (1976), where 
individuals challenges others for their territories based upon 
the Hawk Dove game (a strategy consists of the choice of Hawk 
or Dove for each position of owner and intruder). It does not 
matter whether all choose Hawk as owner and Dove as intruder 
(the Bourgeois strategy), as is common in nature, or the reverse 
strategy of Hawk as intruder and Dove as owner, which is much 
rarer but observed, and resembles Marauder. In real scenarios 
Marauder behaviour would be characterized by frequent short 
contests, and one example of where this is observed is in oyster-
catchers (Stillman et al., 1997).
Broom and Rychtar (in press) allow individuals not just to chal-
lenge a lone handler, but to join ﬁ  ghting groups of any size. This is 
typical behaviour in seagulls, especially when feeding in relatively 
dense populations when such possibilities occur frequently, as in 
Steele and Hockey (1995). It is clear that as food becomes scarcer, 
individuals should be prepared to tackle larger groups, with a cor-
responding smaller chance of success, and indeed this occurs in the 
model. An interesting feature is that this extra willingness to ﬁ  ght 
depresses the feeding rate of the population further, as individuals 
are often engaged in time-consuming contests, which makes it even 
more worthwhile for any individual to want to make challenges. 
ESSs are of the form of challenging groups of below size K for some 
constant K, and it is possible to have many simultaneous ESSs if 
the population is dense.
INFANTICIDE
INTRODUCTION TO INFANTICIDE
The killing of infants by conspeciﬁ  c males has been reported for 
many, mostly mammalian, species. There are several plausible 
hypotheses for an act of infanticide, for instance the elimination 
of a competitor for a limited food supply or utilisation of the infant 
for food. The most common explanation is the sexual selection 
hypothesis of male–male competition for reproduction. The kill-
ing of infants results in an advantage for the male killer under the 
following conditions: only unrelated infants are killed, premature 
loss of an infant enables the mother to conceive the next infant 
sooner and the chances of the killer siring the next infant are high. 
There is a lot of data supporting this hypothesis from carnivores, 
particularly lions, and rodents, for example.
The most investigated group where this behaviour has been 
observed is primates, for example langurs and howlers. Infanticide 
is relatively common in groups which only contain one breeding 
male, which from time to time is replaced by a different male. When 
infanticide is attempted mothers and other group members often 
defend the infant, but due to sexual dimorphism in most primates, 
male defence is more effective, and infanticide is both more difﬁ  cult 
and riskier when a defending male is present.
Early models of infanticide treated it as a simple genetic trait, 
and used the beneﬁ  t of infanticide as a strategy to show how it 
would spread through the population. Breden and Hausfater (1990) 
showed that these effects are unlikely to override within group costs 
of infanticide, since infanticidal males are more likely to be group-
mates with other infanticidal males, and infanticide whilst beneﬁ  t-
ing the killer, is harmful to the group. More   plausibly, infanticide 
is part of a conditional strategy, where most males will   practice 
  infanticide in some conditions, but not others. Most   previous 
theoretical work considers a single male group scenario, which is 
common in the well-studied Hanuman langur.
Recent data show that infanticide also occurs in groups with 
more than one male, for example in chacma baboons, Japanese 
macaques, long-tailed macaques and also Hanuman langurs. 
Reported cases accord with the sexual selection hypothesis in that 
only unrelated infants are killed, the subsequent inter-birth inter-
val is shortened, and the presumed killers are likely to father the 
next infant e.g. in red howlers and Hanuman langurs. There is 
however, much variation in the prevalence of infanticide within 
and between different primate populations and species. Important 
factors include the number of males per group, male replacement 
rates and age at weaning. Low rates of infanticide are common 
when males enter at the bottom of the male hierarchy, higher rates 
occurring when new males are immediately dominant.
A MODEL OF INFANTICIDE IN MULTI-MALE GROUPS
Broom et al. (2004a) considers a two-male group with an infant 
that is a potential target for infanticide. One of the males is the 
presumed father, the other is a new male who has recently joined 
the group. The new male may attempt infanticide or not, and the 
father may defend the infant or not if an attempt is made (an 
attempt here will be a potentially long campaign, so there is only 
one such “attempt”).
The model gives predictions for the type of circumstances when 
infanticide should be prevelant. For example, the new male should 
attack the infant if his chances of fathering the next infant are large, 
the chances of killing the infant are large or the average number 
of extra births following infanticide is large. The father should 
defend the infant if the target infant has a high chance of survival 
to maturity, the probability that the infant will be killed is signiﬁ  -
cantly decreased if the father defends or his residual reproductive 
value is low e.g. he is old. The third of these occurs because with 
little residual reproductive value he can be more reckless about 
his own safety, whereas a young male with many further breeding 
opportunities cannot afford to jeopardize these through injury.
These factors are directly inﬂ  uenced by the infant’s age and the 
dominance relationship between the males. As the infant gets older, 
the beneﬁ  t of killing it declines, and it may also become of greater 
value to its father, as the probability of it surviving to adulthood 
increases. Thus in general there are two thresholds where younger 
infants should be attacked despite defence, older infants should not 
be attacked irrespective of defence but defence should deter attack 
in intermediately aged infants (although these thresholds can be 
outside of the standard infant range, so that in a given scenario 
only one or two of these three situations may occur as the infant 
grows older). Infanticide should be more common in populations 
where the incoming male is dominant, as in chacma baboons or 
Hanuman langurs, since such a dominant has a higher chance of 
success, a lower chance of injury during the attempt, and a greater 
chance of beneﬁ  ting through fathering the next infant.
These examples suggest that the observed variation of infanti-
cide in primate multi-male groups may be explained by differences 
in male migration patterns and the resulting differences in age and 
dominance rank of competing males. The model might even be able 
to explain differences across time in a given group or population.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 51  |  4
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DOMINANCE HIERARCHIES
STABILITY AND MAINTENANCE OF DOMINANCE HIERARCHIES
Many individuals spend a large proportion of their lives in groups. 
When such groups are formed, social relationships occur which form 
common patterns and dominance relationships are often highly 
structured. A common occurrence is the linear dominance hier-
archy: A dominates all, B dominates all but A, C dominates all but 
A and B, down to a bottom individual dominated by all. There are 
advantages to the group to be structured in this way; for example, 
food can be allocated within the group with minimal costly inﬁ  ght-
ing. It may, however, be beneﬁ  cial to the individuals who occupy low 
places in the hierarchy to disrupt the hierarchy if they can.
There has been signiﬁ  cant work on the stability and maintenance 
of these structures over time. Such hierarchies conceal a range of 
possible contests that could occur between their members. If a 
potential contest occurs, each individual must balance the potential 
beneﬁ  ts (e.g. increase in rank) against costs (e.g. injury). Stability, 
and low levels of violence, will occur when lower ranked individu-
als are rarely willing to challenge for higher positions. Experiments 
in fowl show that linear hierarchies are often stable, and that if an 
individual is removed, and subsequently put back later, it often 
automatically returns to its previous position without conﬂ  ict. 
Important theoretical work has considered reproductive skew, start-
ing with Vehrencamp (1983), where the higher the reproductive 
skew, the greater the advantage of occupying the top position(s) 
in the hierarchy. It is also important that subordinate individuals 
prefer to remain part of the group. A model where subordinates 
are given limited mating rights (stay and peace incentives) in order 
not to leave the group or challenge dominants was developed in 
Keller and Reeve (1994). Such situations are observed in different 
species of ant with colonies involving multiple queens, and the 
predicted relationships between levels of skew and relatedness that 
come out of the models (the higher the relatedness, the higher skew) 
is observed in reality (Fournier and Keller, 2001).
Broom et al. (2009) introduce a model which considers a  variety 
of factors. In addition to resource holding potential (RHP), repro-
ductive skew and demography often suggested previously, they 
stress the importance of (i) the variance in relatedness; (ii) the 
costs and likelihood of interventions; and (iii) the value of resources 
and rank in different life stages, which might be tightly linked to the 
life history of a species. For example, in arboreal primate groups 
the costs associated with ﬁ  ghting might be higher, e.g. falling from 
trees. Coalitions are also less likely since in such groups it is more 
difﬁ  cult for a third party to inﬂ  uence ﬁ  ghts, the energetic/time cost 
of trying to interfere would be higher and losing will be more costly 
as already mentioned. This might explain the fact that arboreal 
groups are characterized by lower rates of agonism and generally 
less despotic hierarchies. The model here is perhaps better suited 
to some primate contests, for example the spontaneous aggres-
sion of bonnet macaques (Silk, 1992), rather than others involving 
more elaborate coalitioniary behaviour, where individuals have the 
chance to continually update their strategy during a contest.
DOMINANCE HIERARCHY FORMATION
A new individual will often join an existing group following simple 
rules, such as a daughter slotting in below its mother. What happens 
if a group of individuals are all meeting for the ﬁ  rst time? When 
modelling this situation, it is useful to consider three elements: 
the nature/rules of an individual conﬂ  ict, the pattern of pairing 
of individuals to ﬁ  ght and the effect of a given outcome of a ﬁ  ght 
between two particular individuals (on their dominance, but also 
on which conﬂ  icts occur subsequently). The level of violence in 
individual contests, and so in the formation of the hierarchy as a 
whole, is closely linked to the eventual beneﬁ  ts of attaining high 
position and the costs of engaging in such violence. It is useful to 
consider sub-groups of a larger hierarchy, in particular triads, sub-
groups of three. Linear hierarchies require all triads to be transitive 
(A beats B, C; B beats C) and the number of non-transitive triads 
is a measure of the distance from linearity of a hierarchy.
Important experimental work has been carried out by Chase 
and co-workers on hierarchy formation, for example by Chase and 
Rohwer (1987). Considering triads within ﬂ  ocks of Harris’ spar-
rows, more triads (95%) were transitive than would be expected 
by completely random pairwise dominance relations (75%). Initial 
relationships from the ﬁ  rst two interactions were more likely than 
average to be those certain to lead to transitivity (A beats B, C or A, 
B beat C, not A beats B beats C) and reversals, swaps of dominance 
between two birds, were more common in initially intransitive 
triads. The combination of these two effects, when part of a larger 
group of animals, helps explain the signiﬁ  cant linearity. Note that 
observations of other species, e.g. chickens and rhesus monkeys, 
have shown much higher rates of linearity.
In recent (as yet unpublished) work on the classic dominance 
subject, the chicken, W.B. Lindquist and I.D. Chase looked at groups 
of four Leghorn hens, their interactions and the hierarchies that 
emerged. Dominant individuals generally emerged early on, and 
there was a relative lack of “pair-ﬂ  ips” where A attacks B, and B 
attacks A. The phenomenon of “bursting” was observed, where one 
individual repeatedly attacked another, with the likely aim of estab-
lishing dominance over it, and it appears that dominance emerges 
from a concentrated and purposeful sequence of interactions.
WINNER AND LOSER MODELS
An important type of model of dominance hierarchy formation 
is the winner-loser model, for example Dugatkin (1997) and 
Bonabeau et al. (1999). These models are based upon a sequence of 
pairwise interactions. The winner effect occurs if winning a contest 
increases an individual’s chances of winning a subsequent contest. 
The loser effect occurs if losing a contest increases an individual’s 
chances of losing a subsequent contest.
These effects have been shown experimentally, for instance in 
blue-footed boobies (e.g. Drummond and Canales, 1998). Strong 
winner and loser effects among chicks were observed, when previ-
ous winners and previous losers were paired with inexperienced 
individuals who had not participated in contests. Interestingly, the 
winner effects decreased with the passage of time, but the loser 
effects remained intact throughout the 10 days of the experiment. 
This pattern, with loser effects more signiﬁ  cant than winner effects, 
is a common one in animals.
In general, models of dominance hierarchy formation involving 
winner and loser effects assume the following. Individuals have 
dominance scores depending upon their history. These individuals 
are paired following a set of rules, e.g. at random or in a sequence 
leading to every pair of individuals meeting (all-play-all), and an Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 51  |  5
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interaction between paired individuals happens with a probability 
based upon the dominance level of the two individuals. If an inter-
action occurs, the winner is determined by a function of their two 
dominance scores. The dominance levels of players are updated 
based upon the result of the contest; the winner’s dominance is 
increased, and the loser’s decreased. Individual interactions rein-
force the dominance of winners over losers, and over time can tend 
to hierarchies that are linear, for instance from the original models 
of this type of Landau (1951a,b). It should be noted that the current 
models do not as yet incorporate some of the behaviour observed 
by W.B. Lindquist and I.D. Chase.
The effects can be different if models contain winner and loser 
effects, just winner effects or just loser effects. Clear hierarchies 
tend to result from winner effects alone, whereas for loser effects 
alone the hierarchy below the α individual tends to be indistinct 
(Dugatkin, 1997). Loser effects often dominate winner effects, 
especially if, as indicated above, they endure for a longer time. 
A third effect, the bystander effect, has been introduced, where 
the behaviour of individuals observing, but not participating in, a 
contest is affected by the result of the contest, when meeting one 
of the contestants that its observations have provided information 
about. For example in green swordtail ﬁ  sh (Earley and Dugatkin, 
2002) bystanders often avoid aggression against winners and even 
losers that have been aggressive.
POPULATION STRUCTURES
Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin (1995) introduced an all play all 
contest where individuals’ RHP varied, considering the probability 
of a linear hierarchy emerging. They consider the cases where the 
individuals can accurately assess the RHPs of opponents, and when 
they make no assessment. With assessment, weaker individuals can 
give up without a ﬁ  ght and avoid costs, and the outcome of some 
contests is thus predictable. If RHP is assessed prior to the contest 
a linear hierarchy can be formed with high probability for a group 
of moderate size, e.g. 7 or 8. Without assessment, there are more 
real ﬁ  ghts, and linear hierarchies only form with high probability 
for very small groups, e.g. 4.
Broom et al. (2000) modelled dominance hierarchy forma-
tion as a knockout contest. In this paper, individuals are paired at 
 random, initially with 2n identical individuals. They play a Hawk–
Dove   contest, where there is a cost for a Hawk versus Hawk loss, 
and the reward V is replaced by progress to the next round; in any 
given round, the losers of individual contests are eliminated and 
the winners go through to the next round and are then repaired. 
Individuals receive a reward depending on the round they are 
eliminated, so an individual eliminated in round k receives reward 
Vk. The important top two positions, occupied by the overall win-
ner and losing ﬁ  nalist, are thus established quickly with relatively 
little conﬂ  ict, the total number of contests being one less than the 
group size. Real populations do not play these games exactly, of 
course, but they could be a reasonable approximation for large 
groups, e.g. black grouse and other species come together in leks 
(Hoglund and Alatalo, 1995). As individuals compete, winners may 
move to the more advantageous centre ground, so that winners will 
tend to face other winners. Broom and Cannings (2002) developed 
this model further to use a Swiss tournament, the key difference 
being that this involves all players in a continuing sequence of 
contests, until they have sorted themselves into an order with a 
unique individual that has won all its contests, whereas in Broom 
et al. (2000) losers are eliminated, so that the number of active 
players decreases as the contest progresses. The eventual position 
of an individual is decided by the number of contests that it has 
won. In the model contests between dominants tend to be vio-
lent, those between subordinates less so, with early stage contests 
intermediate. As differences in rewards increases, the overall level 
of violence increases on a sliding scale. Defeat leads an individual 
to be more passive, whereas victory does not necessarily make it 
more aggressive. Thus loser effects are emergent from the model, 
but winner effects are not, which is consistent with real behaviour 
as in Earley and Dugatkin (2002).
DISCUSSION
Violence is prevalent in the animal world, and takes place for 
 logical reasons, from the point of view of the individuals involved, 
and game theoretical modelling is a valuable method for ana-
lysing the interactions between these individuals. Intra-group 
  violence, although propagated by individual needs, can serve a 
useful purpose for the group, but beneﬁ  ts some more than oth-
ers, e.g. in dominance hierarchy formation. In other situations 
violence is beneﬁ  cial to the individual concerned, but detrimental 
to the health of the group e.g. in infanticide. It is also possible 
to have situations where violence is beneﬁ  cial to the individual 
conditional on the behaviour of others, but that for the group as a 
whole, no violence would be preferable to all players being violent. 
Every individual can be worse off, even though their violence is 
  “logical” e.g. in kleptoparasitism, so that even some behaviours 
that look illogical, can have a logical basis. A second example of 
this scenario is the prisoners’ dilemma, where defection is the 
optimal strategy even though it eventually leads to a result that is 
worse for both players.
The population structure and the consequences of the results of 
individual contests differ markedly for the various games that we 
consider. The infanticide model is effectively a single event, where 
the new male may or may not try to kill the infant, and the father 
then may or may not defend, with no subsequent contests and so 
no structure of multiple linked contests. The Hawk–Dove game 
involves a series of independent contests, where the result of an 
interaction has no bearing on future interactions, so although there 
are many contests, there is no dependence structure between them. 
The kleptoparasitism models involve simple pairwise games which 
are not independent, since there is an indirect effect on the frequency 
of subsequent interactions, so that an individual contest affects the 
whole population, and not just the contestants. For the maintenance 
of dominance hierarchies, there is a variety of possible interactions, 
involving the co-location of the various members of the hierarchy. 
As long as groups are small, all such interactions can be assumed 
to occur eventually, and consequently the hierarchy must be stable 
under all possible interactions. If the hierarchy is stable under all 
interactions, individual contests do not affect each other, since noth-
ing ever changes, but any result which changes the hierarchy could 
have a signiﬁ  cant effect on the whole group. In the two varieties of 
model affecting dominance hierarchy formation, the winner–loser 
models and the structured games, there is a sequence of games where 
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by increasing the chance of a previous winner of winning again, 
or which opponents are involved in such contests, for example by 
winners being repaired with winners, or both.
Game theory arguably works better in the biological world than 
the economic one, as Darwinian ﬁ  tness and evolutionary stability 
make a good substitute for the rationality assumed in human games, 
whilst humans often do not behave rationally. This lack of rational-
ity applies even more to the concept of violence between humans. 
Thus the concept of violence in the animal world can also perhaps 
be approached in a more straightforward manner. Vast complica-
tions remain, but animal researchers and modellers do not usually 
need to worry about the rationality of their subjects.
To what extent is there scope for the application of these meth-
ods to human violent behaviour? For the vast majority of human 
  history, people have been subject to evolutionary forces in the 
same way as animals as described above, where the choice of taking 
 violent actions has an effect on the subsequent number of surviving 
offspring. Such choices are less directly relevant in modern society 
for a variety of reasons. Firstly, at least in much of the world, there 
is not the strong evolutionary competition where the strongest 
survive and the weakest perish. Secondly, the way modern societies 
measure success is different to in the past, so that violent behaviour 
is perhaps less likely to attain a high status position (although it is 
not always true that those we consider successful are successful in 
evolutionary terms i.e. the number of surviving offspring). Thirdly, 
violence amongst people is often regarded as an aberration, due 
to poor upbringing, mental health etc. so that it is questionable 
how much of human violent behaviour can be classed as strategic. 
However, it is also the case that violence may have an evolutionary 
cause, due to the long history of when it was effective, even in the 
modern world where it is no longer so effective. Thus evolutionary 
modelling may have something to offer, but great care needs to be 
taken that its application is appropriate where it is used, and this 
will be more problematic than in the animal world.
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